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MULTIPLE TAXATION BY THE STATES
MULTIPLE TAXATION BY THE STATES
WHAT IS LEFT OF IT?
UTNTIL very recently it was never supposed, at least by the
courts, that there was any general rule that the same property
could not be taxed by more than one state. The fact that the same
property was subjected to such a double or more than double tax
burden was generally recognized as somewhat unfortunate; but
it was not regarded as a situation where the courts could properly
interfere. The position of the Supreme Court in the matter is well
typified by the bland statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis in answer
to the argument that the tax sustained by the court resulted in the
same assets being taxed in two states: " To this it is sufficient to
say that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit double
taxation." 1
But these happy days for the states are gone - and apparently
forever. No longer is the Court indifferent to such multiple taxa-
tion; in fact, the present situation is that all taxation of the same
property by two or more states is regarded as at least presump-
tively contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. It is the purpose
of this article to review briefly the steps in this very radical change,
and then to seek to ascertain whether any such multiple taxation
of the same property can still run the gauntlet of the Court's
present interpretation of this vague but perhaps too useful pro-
vision of the Federal Constitution.
As for tangible property the problem is substantially solved. As
early as 1905, in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,2
the Court held definitely that tangible property permanently situ-
ated outside the state of domicil of the owner is subject to taxation
only in the state where so permanently located, and not by the
state of the owner's domicil. The ruling was extended to inherit-
ance taxation twenty years later in Frick v. Pennsylvania,' where
the state of domicil of a decedent was forbidden to impose an in-
heritance tax on tangible personal property permanently located
outside that state, because such property was outside the taxing
1 Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325, 330 (1920).
2 199 U. S. 194. 3 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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jurisdiction of the state of domicil for any purpose. Since there
has never been any serious contention that real estate can be taxed
directly or indirectly by any other jurisdiction than that in which
it is located, these cases seem to have definitely ended multiple
taxation of tangible property.'
Not so early nor so easily was multiple taxation of intangible
property restricted. The reason for this is fairly obvious. Tangi-
ble property always has an actual though not necessarily a perma-
nent location, but a debt is a mere relation between the parties
and has no such location in fact. The same rule applies to a con-
siderable degree to all other forms of intangible property. To
speak then of the location or situs of intangible property for taxa-
tion or any other purposes, as the courts indeed very frequently do,
is to indulge in mere fiction or at the most a distinctly conven-
tional and unrealistic use of that word.
Nevertheless, it has for a long time been thoroughly settled
that a debt is normally to be taxed at the domicil of the creditor
rather than that of the debtor.' Various exceptions to that rule
are, or have been at one time, recognized, but each involves at
least a possibility of double taxation of the same debt, since there
has seldom been any doubt of the power of the taxing jurisdiction
where the creditor is domiciled to tax the debt. This means
multiple taxation of intangible property. And yet, when the
Supreme Court invalidated multiple taxation of tangible property,
it did not immediately follow suit with respect to intangibles, the
obvious reason being the lack of any real situs for the latter kind
of property. In recent years, however, the Court has changed its
view. It has purported to do so by discovering a situs for these
intangibles under the hoary but absurd maxim, mobilia sequuntur
personam, that is to say, intangible property is situated at the
domicil of its owner and is taxable there.
To much of the reasoning in these cases there is, as the Court it-
self has recognized, but one answer: the maxim is only a means to
an end.' The truth is that the Court has come to feel that multiple
4 Such slight remnants as may still exist will be mentioned in the discussion
which follows.
5 State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 35 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872); Kirtland v.
Hotchkiss, 1oo U. S. 491 (1879). But see Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434 (1914).
6 This is clearly indicated by Mr. Justice Sutherland, in First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 328 et seq. (932).
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taxation of intangible property is just as objectionable from an
economic standpoint as if the property were tangible. It is, there-
fore, tending to reach the conclusion that only one tax will be al-
lowed, and also that the jurisdiction permitted to impose the tax
shall be that of the domicil of the creditor or other owner of the
intangible property - not really because the intangible is situated
there but simply as a matter of policy.
The first of these recent cases I to show definitely the change
in attitude as to the taxation of intangibles is Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota.' Here it was held that Minnesota could
not impose an inheritance tax upon the transfer of bonds issued
by the state itself and by certain of its municipal corporations,
which bonds had belonged to a decedent domiciled in the State of
New York, the bonds being kept at his domicil. The Court re-
jected the argument that Minnesota was entitled to tax the transfer
of these bonds because its law was necessary to give them validity,
and held that only New York could impose an inheritance tax
with respect to them.
The doctrine of this case was carried still further in Baldwin v.
Missouri,9 in which Missouri was not allowed to tax the transfer
by death of Missouri bank accounts, securities issued by Missouri
citizens, and other securities, all kept in Missouri, but owned by a
decedent domiciled in Illinois. The Court thus adhered to its pre-
vious position that securities are to be treated for taxation pur-
poses as mere evidences of indebtedness rather than as themselves
tangible property. 0
Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm." followed. A resident of
Illinois had owned all the stock in a South Carolina corporation
doing business in that state and had made very large advances to
that corporation in order to enable it to carry on its business. No
attempt was made by the representatives of his estate to resist a
South Carolina tax upon the transfer of the stock of this corpora-
7 For a more general discussion of these cases, see Lowndes, The Passing of
Situs-Jurisdction to Tax Shares of Corporate Stock (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv.
777. See also Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxa-
tio,, (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 628.
8 280 U. S. 204 (1930). 9 281 U. S. 586 (i93o).
10 Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392 (19o7) ; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. s
(1928).
11 282 U. S. 1 (1930).
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tion. They did contend, however, that the transfer of the indebted-
ness owed by the corporation to the decedent was not taxable by
South Carolina, and this contention was sustained by the Federal
Supreme Court, holding that such transfer was taxable only by
Illinois.
The last of this series of cases, and in some respects the most
important, is First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine.2 The Court
invalidated a tax by the state of incorporation upon a transfer of
stock by a nonresident decedent, upon the ground that such trans-
fer could be taxed only by the state of his domicil. The Court
recognized that while corporate stock is not exactly a chose in ac-
tion, it is closely analogous to it, and that the objections to multiple
taxation of credits are likewise applicable to stock. It was con-
ceded that all such intangible property has no actual situs, and
though quoting the maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam, the Court
plainly realized that it was deciding a question solely of policy.
It may perhaps be urged that the still more recent case of
Burnet v. Brooks "3 represents a change of view by the Court
toward again permitting such multiple taxation, but it is not be-
lieved that this is the case. Here a nonresident alien, now de-
ceased, had kept foreign and domestic bonds, also stock of a
foreign corporation, in the United States. It was held that these
securities were all to be included in the measure of the federal
estate tax. The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, said that Congress must have intended to tax these se-
curities, since it was commonly supposed at the time the taxing
act was passed that they were within the taxing power of the
jurisdiction where they were kept, and that such supposition was
justified by previous decisions of the Court then in apparently
good standing. But one would still assume that such tax would,
under the decisions of the Court just discussed, be contrary to the
Fifth Amendment just as similar taxes by the states had been held
to be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held,
however, that the limitations of the powers of the states were not
applicable to the national government, which, unlike the states, is
a sovereignty in the international sense. 4
12 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
13 288 U. S. 378 (1933), Note (i933) 47 H-RTv. L. REv. 307.
'4 Compare the doctrine of Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
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Whatever may be thought of this distinction," it is clear that the
Court did not intend in any way to modify the decisions previously
discussed as to the limitations upon the power of the states. The
Court made this intention explicit:
"The decisive point is that the criterion of state taxing power by
virtue of the relation of the States to each other under the Constitution
is not the criterion of the taxing power of the United States by virtue of
its sovereignty in relation to the property of nonresidents. The Consti-
tution creates no such relation between the United States and foreign
countries as it creates between the States themselves.
"Accordingly, in what has been said, we in no way limit the authority
of our decisions as to state power. We determine national power in rela-
tion to other countries and their subjects by applying the principles of
jurisdiction recognized in international relations. Applying those prin-
ciples we cannot doubt that the Congress had the power to enact the
statute. ... 16
It may be contended that all the cases just discussed, since they
involve inheritance or estate taxes, are not applicable to property
taxes. This argument cannot, however, be sustained. Any gov-
ernmental unit may properly use as a measure of an inheritance
tax, property which is within its taxing jurisdiction for property
tax purposes, and vice versa. When the Court decides that a state
may not impose an inheritance tax measured by certain property,
it is necessarily deciding that such property is not subject to direct
taxation by the same jurisdiction. While there are one or two
previous intimations by the Court that the same rules as to juris-
diction do not apply to property and inheritance taxes, 7 yet any
such idea was definitely repudiated in Frick v. Pennsylvania,8
where the Court pointed out that inheritance and property taxes
are both dependent upon jurisdiction of the property. Indeed,
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine 9 clearly announced the same
proposition, citing the Frick case as conclusive on the point.
The Court is therefore definitely committed to the proposition
that only the domicil of the creditor may tax the transfer of se-
curities or the securities themselves. That this represents a
15 See Note (X933) 47 IHARv. L. RE-. 307, 310-1I. 16 288 U. S. at 405.
17 Buck v. Beach, 2o6 U. S. 392 (1907). See also Mr. Justice Stone, con-
curring, in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
18 268 U. S. 473 (1925). 19 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
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change of view from its previous decisions the Court freely recog-
nizes; indeed, Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota 20 ex-
plicitly overrules Blackstone v. Miller,2 which is probably the
leading case to sanction taxation by the state of domicil of the
debtor. Other cases 22 representing the same point of view as
Blackstone v. Miller must also be deemed to have" ceased to have
other than historic interest." 2 All this older authority is clearly
irreconcilable with the theory that only one jurisdiction has power
to tax intangible property in the form of credits, and that that
jurisdiction is the one in which the creditor is domiciled. But, as
will presently appear, there remain doctrines, not yet explicitly
disapproved by the Court, which will still permit this multiple
property taxation in certain circumstances. And to some extent
there still exist various remnants of other sorts of multiple taxa-
tion, many of them explicitly approved. For the most part, this
was before the Court had taken its present position of hostility to
multiple taxation. But in order even to prophesy intelligently -
which is all the boldest person would attempt to do at this time
-how far the Court may go to wipe out the entire principle of
multiple taxation, these various kinds of multiple taxation which
have been permitted by the Court must be considered with a view
to determining how far the cases sanctioning them are still in good
standing.
POSSIBILITIES OF MULTIPLE TAXATION STILL EXISTING
Even as respects tangible property there is at least a theoretical
possibility of multiple taxation under existing rules. It has al-
ready been pointed out that such property may be taxed only by
the jurisdiction where it is permanently located,2 4 but it has also
20 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
21 i88 U. S. 189 (1903).
22 Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434 (914); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S.
473 (1925), so far as it approved taxation of the transfer of corporate stock by
the state of incorporation apart from the domicil of the owner. For an extreme
example of such repudiated reasoning, see also In re Scott's Estate, 129 Misc. 625,
222 N. Y. Supp. 515 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
23 Mr. Justice Sutherland, in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S.
312, 322 (2932).
24 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. i94 (1905); Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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been held that the domicil of the owner of tangible property may
tax it unless it is shown to be permanently located elsewhere.25
Here too is the same implicit, though certainly not explicit, idea
that since property not permanently located anywhere is still
taxable somewhere, the Court will fall back on the domicil of the
owner as the proper taxing jurisdiction. In theory such property
can still be taxed only once, but in fact the possibility exists that
it might be taxed in a jurisdiction other than the domicil of the
owner on the ground that it was permanently located there, and
again at the domicil of the owner because of his inability to prove
that it was permanently located in another jurisdiction. This,
however, is hardly serious; if it should happen, the unfortunate
owner would simply be subjected to tax liability at his domicil be-
cause of his inability to prove his case, rather than his being from
a legal standpoint subjected to multiple taxation upon the same
property."
More serious from the standpoint of multiple taxation is the
doctrine that a jurisdiction where a" stock in trade" as a whole is
permanently located may tax the same, even though the particular
items of such stock in trade may not be permanently located
there.27 Thus, there is a possibility of a single commodity con-
stituting a portion of a stock in trade and being subjected to a tax
burden on that theory, and also being taxed by itself at the domicil
of the owner. This would be real multiple taxation, but probably
it is not very serious in fact. If it became so, the courts would be
very likely to interfere.
Another possibility of multiple taxation of the same property
might arise from the confusion as to whether debts evidenced by
what may generally be termed commercial securities, such as
bonds, promissory notes and similar documents, are to be treated
as tangible or intangible property. The theory has been enunci-
ated in some cases 28 that such commercial securities are to be
treated as tangible property and so taxed where they are actually
25 New York v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (19o6).
26 Cf. In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, i7o Atl. 6oi (Prerog. Ct.
1934), (I934) 82 U. oP PA. L. Rv. 769. For the supplemental opinion, see 172 Atl.
503 (N. J. Prerog. Ct. 1934).
27 Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 14, U. S. 18 (i89I).
28 See Blackstone v. Miller, i88 U. S. i89 (1903), and Wheeler v. Sohmer,
233 U. S. 434 (1914).
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located even though their owner be domiciled in another jurisdic-
tion. The theory has undoubtedly much practical sense. While
from a legal standpoint such commercial paper is mere evidence
of indebtedness, yet from a business standpoint it is usually
thought of and actually treated as the property itself in tangible
form. Furthermore, taxation should be based upon practical
rather than theoretical and legalistic considerations. In holding
that such paper is mere evidence of indebtedness, however, that
the debt is the substantial property, and is thus taxable only at
the domicil of the creditor, the Supreme Court, it would seem,
has now finally excluded any possibility of multiple taxation of
intangible property in the form of debts. 9
As to multiple taxation of corporate stock, it would appear that
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine " has definitely ended that.
The Court was there constrained to admit that its own previous
decisions approving such taxation are now overruled."' Neverthe-
less, it is not entirely clear that such multiple taxation cannot still
be effected, if the state of incorporation reserves in its general
corporation act the power to impose a tax upon the stock, or its
transfer, even though the stock is held by nonresidents." And a
more serious and burdensome scheme of multiple taxation is ap-
parently approved by the Court in permitting states to tax con-
solidated corporations on the basis of their entire capital stock. 3
This is very serious, both theoretically and practically, since it
permits a state to burden foreign corporations not doing business
in the state.34 The Court, it would seem, must be opposed to this
unreasonable and economically unsound burden, but it has not as
29 See cases cited in -note io, supra; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (i93o).
So 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
31 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) (compare as to this point note
22, supra); Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. i (1914). See also Judy v. Beckwith,
137 Iowa 24, 114 N. W. 565 (19o8).
82 Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (i9o5). Cf. Tappan v. Merchants' Nat.
Bank, i Wall. 490 (U. S. z873).
83 Delaware R. R. Tax, i8 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873); Kansas City Memphis &
Birmingham R. R. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. III (I916). This hardship is intensified by
the ruling of the Court that a state may compel a foreign corporation to take
out a domestic charter, as a condition to being admitted to do business in the state.
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931).
34 A so-called consolidated corporation consists actually of two or more separate
corporations, only one of which is ordinarily doing business in any particular
state.
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yet so decided. On the whole, in this matter of taxation of cor-
porate stock the Court is very definitely hostile to multiple taxation
and has wiped out a large part of it; but it is not, or at least does
not yet appear to be, wholly gone.
With regard to the taxation of trust property, the only direct
decision of the Court seems to be Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Virginia,35 and this case does not wholly clarify the situation.
Here a Maryland trustee held property for infant beneficiaries,
residents of Virginia, the income to accumulate for the benefici-
aries until they reached, respectively, the age of twenty-five.
Virginia attempted to tax the trust property, but the Court de-
nied its right to do so, holding that only Maryland could tax the
property - which consisted, it may be noted, mostly of securities.
The opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice McReynolds.
Mr. Justice Stone submitted a concurring opinion suggesting that
while Virginia could not tax the entire property, yet it might pos-
sibly tax the interest of the beneficiaries. If this suggestion is
sound, it opens the door to at least economic multiple taxation of
trust property. From a purely legalistic standpoint it may be
defended as imposing the tax upon another piece of property -
namely, the equitable interest of the beneficiaries, which is en-
tirely separate from the legal interest of the trustee." And such
equitable interest is obviously located for taxation purposes at
the domicil of the beneficiaries. Indeed this fits in with the the-
ory of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota: 1 that intangi-
ble property - and the interest of the beneficiaries in trust prop-
erty is obviously closely analogous to intangible property even
though the trust property itself be tangible - is to be taxed at the
domicil of the owner. But that brings us back to the substantial
burdens of multiple taxation upon the same economic interest,
which it is now the apparent purpose of the Court to wipe out as
completely as possible. It may be that the Court would be more
tolerant toward multiple taxation of such property where the bene-
ficiary of the trust was the settlor, who had thus created the trust
for his own benefit; but even this is not certain. What the final
85 280 U. S. 83 (1929). See also Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27 (1928).
36 See Developments in the Law-Taxation: z933 (1934) 47 HAv. L. REv.
1209, 1224.
37 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
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solution of this general problem will be is not easily prophesied;
but it would seem that the situation respecting trust property is so
uncertain that from it little argument is afforded either way as to
the probability of the Court's condemning other doctrines which
permit multiple taxation.
With regard to income taxation the Court has definitely taken
a more liberal point of view toward the power of the states. As
showing that the Court will not go so far as to do away with multi-
ple property taxation, this may be somewhat significant; but the
income tax is not by the better view a property tax and in fact is
sui generis"
In Maguire v. Trefry " it was held that Massachusetts might tax
income received by a resident of that state from a Pennsylvania
trustee. The trust property consisted solely of securities held in
Pennsylvania. The Court was troubled about the possibility of
multiple taxation because of the settled idea of the Massachusetts
court that an income tax is a property tax.4" However, all that was
said in this connection was," In the present case we are not dealing
with the right to tax securities which have acquired a local situs." 4'
DeGanay v. Lederer42 presented a problem as to United States
taxation of the income of a nonresident alien. As already pointed
out 43 this problem is somewhat different from the application of
state taxes to residents of other states, and so any limitations which
the Court subsequently put upon property and inheritance taxa-
tion may not be applicable here, even though the income tax is
to be regarded as a form of property taxation. The plaintiff in this
case was a citizen of France but owned a large amount of securities
issued by American corporations and secured by property in this
country. These securities were kept in the United States in the
hands of an American agent. The plaintiff was held subject to the
United States income tax on the income from such securities. The
Court relied first on the theory that the securities were tangible
property. This theory has of course since been definitely repudi-
ated.44 The Court further relied on the idea that multiple taxa-
38 See Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax (1933) 17 Mnqw. L. Rzv. 127.
39 253 U. S. 12 (1920).
40 See Brown, supra note 38, at 132 et seq. 42 250 U. S. 376 (1919).
4: 253 U. S. at i6. 43 See note 14, supra.
44 Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. i (1928); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586 (393o).
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tion of such securities is permissible, and such a theory is now very
dubious, as we have seen. But the doctrine of the case will prob-
ably still be followed, either on the theory of Burnet v. Brooks 45
or else on the still more supportable proposition, leading to the
same result, that an income tax is sui generis, and so has no neces-
sary relation to the power to tax the property from which the in-
come is derived.
Even when a state imposes an income tax only upon income
from property within its own taxing jurisdiction,46 still the possi-
bility of multiple property taxation exists and would probably
affect the construction of such taxing laws.4" The state can, how-
ever, still collect all the revenue from this source to which it is rea-
sonably entitled, even if the possibility of multiple taxation should
be wholly done away with, by amending the income tax laws so as
to increase their scope -which can still be done at least with re-
spect to residents. 48
A corporate income tax may also be justified as an excise tax,
and may even be sustained as such though no income was actually
earned.4" This raises the problem of excise taxation in general.
Such taxes are certainly broader in scope than property taxes,
so that a particular tax may be sustained as an excise tax when as
a property tax it would be of dubious validity, or even clearly in-
valid."0 But, as already pointed out, the two kinds of taxes have
often a close bearing upon each other, so that excise taxes might
conceivably throw some light upon the present legality of multiple
property taxation.
In very many instances an excise tax will, by the terms of the
statute, be measured only by assets within the state, despite the
45 288 U. S. 378 (1933).
46 Ewa Plantation Co. v. Wilder, 298 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923). Cf. Hill v.
Carter, 47 F.(2d) 869 (C. C. A. 9th, '93'). Both these cases involve the con-
struction of the income tax statutes of the Territory of Hawaii, which is thus
limited.
47 See Harvard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 284 Mass. 225, 187 N. E. 596
(i933).
48 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932), holding that a state
may tax the entire income of residents, even though such income is derived wholly
or partly from sources outside the state.
49 Bass Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd. v. State Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
50 Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325 (1920); Susque-
hanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 297 (i931).
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fact that it may be constitutional to include other assets. Where
this is the case, it is occasionally said that some assets situated out-
side the state but used in carrying on business within the state may
be included in the measure of the excise tax levied with respect to
that business; "' but this is not really a case of multiple taxation,
since those assets are not as such taxed. The power to levy excise
taxes is of course not unlimited, but the limitations are somewhat
broader than those restricting property taxes." It is believed,
therefore, that the excise tax situation is not much different from
that of income taxes and that such multiple tax burdens as may
still be permitted with respect to excise taxes do not have an im-
portant bearing either way as to the continued position of multiple
property tax burdens.
Before concluding the discussion of these miscellaneous situa-
tions where multiple tax burdens have been approved, we must
consider the permission accorded to the states to tax intangibles
like good-will and the value of a going business used by a foreign
corporation in carrying on business within the state. In the lead-
ing case " to approve such a tax counsel for the taxpayer raised
the point of multiple taxation 5 - that is to say, that the same in-
tangible property would be taxed at the domicil of the corporation
and also where it is doing business. The Court does not seem
squarely to meet this point, but it does state that the intangible
property is not situated at New York, the domicil of the corpora-
tion, but rather where the business is done.5 It further says:
"It may be true that the principal office of the corporation is in New
York, and that for certain purposes the maxim of the common law was
' mobilia personam sequuntur; but that maxim was never of universal
application, and seldom interfered with the right of taxation. . . . It
would certainly seem a misapplication of the doctrine expressed in that
maxim to hold that by merely transferring its principal office across the
51 In re Dodge Bros., 241 Mich. 665, 217 N. W. 777 (i928). But cf. People
ex rel. Hans Rees' Sons v. Miller, go App. Div. 591, 86 N. Y. Supp. 193 (3d Dept.
1904).
52 Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143 (1915); Provident
Say. Ass'n v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103 (I95).
52 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, rehearing denied, i66 U. S. i85
(1897).
54 See i66 U. S. at 204.
55 See id. at 223--24.
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river to Jersey City the situs of $12,000,000 of intangible property for
purposes of taxation was changed from the State of New York to that of
New Jersey." 56
From this one would infer that the Court would not permit the
state of the domicil of the owner to tax such intangible property,
which it says -more reasonably than in most of these cases in-
volving intangibles -is partly situated in all other states where
the taxpayer does business.
This problem has arisen several times in connection with the
taxation of seats on stock and grain exchanges by the jurisdiction
where the member of the exchange carries on his own business,
which jurisdiction is not the location of the exchange itself. Citi-
zens Nat. Bank v. Durr 5'7 approved taxation by Ohio of a seat on
the New York Stock Exchange held by a resident of Ohio and
used by him in carrying on business in that state. Probably the
decision cannot seriously be questioned, in view of the fact that
the taxpayer's membership in the exchange makes his Ohio busi-
ness more profitable and may therefore be reasonably considered
an asset of that business. But the more vital question for our
purpose is whether the state where the exchange is located could
also tax the seat.
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals has taken the
position that this is within the power of the state, though the court
decided unanimously that the state tax law did not actually impose
such a tax." The problem was squarely presented in Rogers v.
Hennepin County," where the Federal Supreme Court held that
Minnesota might tax nonresident members of the Minneapolis
Chamber of Commerce, which acted as a grain exchange, upon
their membership in that body. It must obviously be concluded
that if multiple taxation of all intangible property goes, as it has
already gone with respect to shares of stock, the doctrine of this
case will also be superseded. But the doctrine is itself objection-
able as permitting multiple taxation of a somewhat burdensome,
nature, upon which the Court is now frowning. It would seem
much more in accordance with the present view of the Court to
hold that such an exchange seat may be taxed by the jurisdiction
56 Ibid. 58 People v. Feitner, 167 N. Y. i, 60 N. E. 265 (igoi).
57 257 U. S. 99 (1921). 59 240 U. S. 184 (1916).
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where it is actually used in business and not where the exchange
happens to be located.6 For here also have we a situation where
intangible property may fairly be said to have an actual geographi-
cal location.
THE BUSINESS SITUS DOCTRINE
The most important exception to the rule that intangible prop-
erty is taxable at the domicil of the owner is in the case of an
indebtedness constituting a part of the assets used in a continuous
business; it may then be taxed as property where the business is
carried on, even though the owner of the business is a resident of
another jurisdiction. This is the doctrine generally referred to as
" the business situs of credits ," and it is, or at least has been,
almost universally accepted.
The conventional situation where this doctrine is applicable is
one where a person (including a corporation) carries on a con-
tinuous money-lending business in a jurisdiction apart from his
domicil. The test seems basically whether such a business is car-
ried on regularly and in competition with local money lenders.
As the Supreme Court said in upholding a local tax upon credits
so created, " We are not dealing here merely with a single credit
or a series of separate credits, but with a business." 62 Because
of this competition with local money lenders, who would of course
be similarly taxed, this result is entirely reasonable.
Up to date the doctrine has been regularly sustained by the Su-
preme Court. The earliest direct decision is New Orleans v. Stem-
pel,63 where a resident of New York kept an agent in Louisiana
with power to invest and reinvest in mortgages on Louisiana prop-
erty. It was held that the indebtedness secured by these mortgages
had its business situs in Louisiana and was subject to Louisiana
taxation. No point is made as to the residence of the debtors,
though presumably most of them must have been residents of
Louisiana; what is, however, emphasized by the Court is that the
60 This will normally, though not invariably, be also the domicil of the taxpayer.
61 This is the title of T. R. Powell's excellent article discussing this question
in (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89. See also 2 CooLmY, TA.xATioN (4 th ed. X924)
§§465-68; GooDRicH, CoN7acT oF LAWS (1927) 90-92; Note, L. R. A. I915C
923-28.
62 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 402 (19o7).
63 175 U. S. 309 (1899).
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money-lending business was carried on in that state. Some stress
is laid upon the fact that the bonds and mortgages were kept in
Louisiana, but later decisions show that this is not a point of great
importance except possibly in connection with the interpretation
of the state statute.
New Orleans v. Stempel was followed by Bristol v. Washington
County,64 where it was held that Minnesota might tax credits
owned by a New York resident but created through continuous
loans by resident agents in Minnesota, even though the owner kept
the evidences of the indebtedness and the mortgages at her home
in New York rather than leaving them with the agents, and even
though during the latter part of the period in question the Minne-
sota agents were deprived of any power to satisfy mortgages.
These differences from the previous case were held to be imma-
terial, since the money-lending business was actually carried on
in Minnesota. The Court has declared that no tax may be levied
where the alleged credits are not real, even though a continuous
business is carried on in the state seeking to impose the tax,66
but, on the other hand, the mere fact that the credits are in a
somewhat unusual form is wholly immaterial.66
As might be expected, the states have not been backward in
taking advantage of this permission which the federal courts have
given; in fact such taxation was customary long before the Su-
preme Court had explicitly approved it." Undoubtedly, the sub-
jection of such credits to local taxation demands a somewhat con-
tinuous business, and this normally requires a resident agent, but
it is, of course, unnecessary that such agent receive any compen-
sation.68 The general test of business situs accepted by both
federal and state courts is well described by the highest court of
California:
64 177 U. S. I33 (i9oo). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans,
205 U. S. 395 (1907).
65 Board of Assessors v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 U. S. 517 (igio).
66 Board of Assessors v. Comptoir Nat. D'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388 (19o3).
67 Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152 (1849). Walker v. Jack, 88 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 6th,
1898), involved the Ohio law, but in a later decision in the same case, 96 Fed.
578 (C. C. S. D. Ohio x899), it was held that the Ohio statute did not subject such
credits to taxation unless sole control of them was surrendered to the local agent.
See also, for a more recent decision in this sort of case, Clay, Robinson, & Co. v.
Douglas County, 88 Neb. 363, 129 N. W. 548 (1g11).
68 Hathaway v. Edwards, 42 Ind. App. 22, 85 N. E. 28 (i9o8).
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"If we may venture to formulate a general statement of this modifi-
cation of the rule, it would be that this can only result where the posses-
sion and control of the property right has been localized in some
independent business or investment away from the owner's domicile, so
that its substantial use and value primarily attach to and become an-
asset of the outside business. In other words, while a non-resident may
own the business, the business controls and utilizes in its own operation.
and maintenance the credits and income thereof." '0
From this it follows that credits held in a state apart from the
residence of its owner merely for collection and without any in-
tention of reinvesting the proceeds are not there taxable, because
no continuous business is carried on." This is even more clearly
true with respect to credits held merely for safekeeping."' Where,
however, a business was carried on in the state through a local
agent, the credits were held still taxable after the death of the
owner, even though this of course revoked the power of the agent
to reinvest. 2 The credits have similarly been found taxable where
the local agent is engaged solely in closing up the businessY.7  The
correctness of these decisions is extremely doubtful, since the busi-
ness seems to have come to an end. But there are even scattered
authorities that credits held in a state merely to be collected for
the benefit of a nonresident owner are taxable where so held.7 4
These last decisions are certainly unsound, for the vital require-
ment of a continuing business is there absent. The attempt of
the Indiana Supreme Court 71 to sustain local taxation upon notes
owned by a resident of Ohio and sent to Indiana for safekeeping
- and also, though unsuccessful, to avoid Ohio taxation - was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court,76 which explicitly
69 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles County, I88 Cal. 491, 494,
205 Pac. io76, io77 (1922).
70 Hinckley v. San Diego County, 49 Cal. App. 668, i94 Pac. 77 (1920);
Goldgart v. People ex rel. Goar, xo6 Ill. 25 (1883) ; Reat v. People ex rel. Ganna-
way, 201 Ill. 469, 66 N. E. 242 (1903); Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472 (7877).
See also Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588 (,875).
71 Board of Comm'rs v. Hewitt, 76 Kan. 816, 93 Pac. 18i (,907); Crosby v.
Charlestown, 78 N. H. 39, 95 At. 1043 (1915).
72 In re Miller, I6 Iowa 446, 9o N. W. 89 (1902).
73 State v. London & No. Am. Mtge. Co., 8o Minn. 277, 83 N. W. 339 (7900).
74 Redmond v. Commissioners, 87 N. C. 722 (1882); Hall v. Miller, 102 Tex.
289, II5 S. W. 168 (i909).
75 Buck v. Miller, 147 Ind. 586, 45 N. E. 647, 47 N. E. 8 (1897).
76 Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392 (1907).
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denied the application of the business situs theory upon which the
state court had in part relied.
The business situs doctrine is not, however, restricted to the
conventional situations already outlined. It is applied whenever
the credits are deemed to be necessary assets in carrying on a
continuing business, even though the credits themselves are only
incidental to that business rather than its subject. For example,
it is generally held that bonds deposited by a foreign insurance
corporation with the state authorities as a condition to carrying
on business are taxable by the state of deposit."
Indications are at hand of a general tendency to tax even credits
which are merely incidental to another business of a distinct kind,
as where goods are sold in the state on credit. Thus, foreign
insurance companies may be taxed upon credits for deferred pre-
miums on policies held by residents of the state, even though such
premiums are not evidenced by notes or other memoranda.78
And bank d~posits kept in the state by a foreign corporation and
used in connection with its local business may be subject to taxa-
tion by that state,"' as distinguished from where the deposits are
kept merely for convenience in transmitting them to the home
office of the company.8
The most striking example of this application of the business
situs theory is the taxation of ordinary business corporations with
a home office in another state on amounts owing to them for sales
of commodities on credit though a branch in the state. Over the
fairness of this result there can again be little disagreement, since
domestic corporations and other business units would be subject
to taxation on similar credits. The basis for such taxation, ap-
proved by a distinct majority of the opinions, is the business situs
77 Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611 (x9o5); State v.
Board of Assessors, 47 La. Ann. I544, 18 So. 519 (i8g). The business situs doc-
trine may also be used to shift the taxation of securities so deposited by a domestic
corporation from the county in which its principal office is situated to the county
of the state capital. Texas Fid. & Bonding Co. v. Austin, 112 Tex. 229, 246 S. W.
1026 (7922). But only if the state statute so provides. Great So. Life Ins.
Co. v. Austin, 112 Tex. 1, 243 S. W. 778 (1922).
78 Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S.
346 (i9ii); Orient Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 227 U. S. 358 (1gi).
79 Commonwealth v. Dun, 37 Ky. L. Rep. 561, 702 S. W. 859 (i9o7). But cf.
Hillman Land & Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 331, 746 S. W. 776 (I972).
80 State v. Newark, 62 N. J. L. 74, 40 Atl. 573 (1898).
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theory."' Even more clearly is this the case where the foreign cor-
poration carries on its manufacturing and most other activities in
the state.82 Sometimes, however, a state which will tax credits
resulting from a lending business in the state does not tax credits
from the sale of commodities.83 The power of the state to impose
this tax upon credits resulting from sales is not defeated by the
fact that all money collected must be immediately transmitted to
the home office, so long as the selling business is still continuous,84
but the tax is not imposed unless it is considered that the credits
are necessarily used in connection with carrying on the business
of the local branch. 5 If the corporation has no branch in the
state but has merely a soliciting agent without power to bind the
corporation, it is considered that no business is carried on in
the state in such a way as to give a business situs to credits result-
ing from sales solicited by him, and no such tax can be imposed.8"
The proper test as to the taxability of credits in all these cases is
substantially the same; namely, is a regular and continuous busi-
ness carried on in the state and are such credits necessarily inci-
dent to that business?
Assuming now that the credits are subjected to taxation in a
jurisdiction other than that of the domicil of the creditor under
some application of the business situs theory as already explained,
the question remains whether they may also be taxed, as credits
generally are, by the jurisdiction in which the creditor is domi-
ciled. If so, the same credits are taxed at least twice8 7
81 Armour Packing Co. v. Savannah, 115 Ga. 140, 41 S. E. 237 (1902);
Monongahela River Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Assessors, 115 La.
564, 39 So. 6oi (iuo5); People v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390 (1872); Marshall
Hardware Co. v. Multnomah County, 58 Ore. 469, ii5 Pac. i5o (1911); Jesse
French Piano & Organ Co. v. Dallas, 61 S. W. 942 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o). See also
New York ex rel. Burke, Ltd. v. Wells, 2o8 U. S. 14 (i9o8). Contra: Vicksburg v.
Armour Packing Co., 24 So. 224 (Miss. 1898).
82 Commonwealth v. United Cigarette Mach. Co., 1i9 Va. 447, 89 S. E. 935
(1916).
83 Crane Co. v. Des Moines, 208 Iowa 164, 225 N. W. 344 (1929); National
Metal Edge Box Co. v. Readsboro, 94 Vt. 405, izx AtI. 386 (1920).
84 State v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 147 Minn. 339, i8o N. W. io8 (1920).
85 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles County, x88 Cal. 491, 205
Pac. io76 (1922).
86 Endicott, Johnson & Co. v. Multnomah County, 96 Ore. 679, 19o Pac. 1io9
'1920), distinguishing Marshall Hardware Co. v. Multnomah County, 58 Ore.
469, ii5 Pac. I5o (1911).
87 In the case of credits owned by a consolidated corporation, they might
thus be taxed more than twice.
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Many states do not in fact impose this form of multiple taxa-
tion. Perhaps, the most carefully considered recent case to this
effect is Miami Coal Co. v. Fox." An Indiana corporation was
engaged in the business of mining coal in Indiana, but had its sole
selling and collecting office in Illinois. The Supreme Court of
Indiana decided that the debts owed to it by its customers, having
a business situs in Illinois, could be taxed there and could not
therefore be taxed in Indiana. It was stated by the court that
"natural justice" prevents Indiana from also taxing these credits,
but it is not entirely clear whether the court thinks it is deciding
the question as a matter of the construction of the Indiana taxing
statutes or as a matter of constitutional law.
A number of other decisions are to the same effect,89 but occa-
sionally with a dictum that such taxation is within the power of
the domiciliary state though the power has not been exercised 9 -
thus asserting the power and giving up the tax solely as a matter
of statutory construction. Some cases where the court purports to
take this point of view are not precisely applicable, since it would
appear that the credits in question did not really have a business
situs in the other state and so were not taxable there.9 In others
stress is laid upon the fact that there was no showing that the state
where the business situs was alleged to exist had actually imposed
any tax on the credits; " some courts, however, explicitly state that
this is immaterial. 3 At all events there is substantial authority
that this multiple taxation of the same credits will be avoided by
a refusal of the state of domicil to tax them when the state of
business situs does so.
The numerical majority is probably committed to the contrary
view, and permits the taxation by the state of domicil even though
credits are taxed in another state under the business situs theory.9 4
88 203 Ind. 99, 176 N. E. ii (X932).
89 Buck v. Board of Comm'rs, IO3 Kan. 270, 173 Pac. 344 (1918); Howell v.
Gordon, 127 Mich. 517, 86 N. E. 1042 (19o); People ex rel. Jefferson v. Gardner,
5I Barb. 352 (N. Y. 1868); People ex rel. Jefferson v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576 (1882);
Poppleton v. Yamhill County, i8 Ore. 377, 23 Pac. 253 (1890).
90 See People ex rel. Jefferson v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576, 580 (1882).
91 Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588 (1875); Crosby v. Charlestown, 78 N. H. 39,
9S Aft. 1043 (:1915).
92 Clay, Robinson & Co. v. Douglas County, 88 Neb. 363, 129 N. W. 548
(1911); State v. Gaylord, 73 Wis. 316, 41 N. W. 521 (1889).
11 See Commonwealth v. West India Oil Ref. Co., 138 Ky. 828, 831, 129 S. W.
301, 302 (1910). 94 2 CooLEY, TAXATION § 467.
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Many cases ignore the possibility of this multiple taxation9 5 or
even expressly state that it is not material. 6 And the Supreme
Court, not merely inferentially but very explicitly, gave validity
to it under the Federal Constitution in Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Louisville," where a resident of Kentucky was held taxable
there on bank accounts in Missouri banks used in connection with
a business carried on in Missouri, although the Court admitted
that under the business situs doctrine Missouri could also tax the
same bank .accounts. The ruling was repeated in Cream of Wheat
Co. v. Grand Forks County."
If this were all, there would obviously be no problem as to the
validity of the business situs doctrine. All that could be said
would be that where a person carries on business in another state
and uses credits in carrying on that business, the credits are tax-
able in that state and may also, at least so far as the Federal Con-
stitution is concerned, be taxed at his domicil. To the seeming
injustice of the situation, the answer would be that it is a burden
which goes along with carrying on business of this nature in an-
other state; and "the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit
double taxation." o
But all these doctrines were enunciated before the Court had
evidenced its clear, if recent, hostility to multiple taxation of
credits and other intangible property. In these important cases
the Court noticed - or, probably it would be more correct to say,
was compelled by counsel for the unsuccessful states to meet the
point- that the new light which had burst upon it had a rather
direct effect upon its previous approval of the business situs doc-
trine. That the Court accomplished the feat of dodging the point
95 Scripps v. Board of Review, 183 I. 278, 55 N. E. 700 (1899); Appeal of
Borden, 208 Ill. 369, 7o N. E. 310 (1904); State v. Board of Assessors, 47 La.
Ann. 1544, I8 So. Si9 (1895). And see Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Dallas,
61 S. W. 942 (Tex. Civ. App. i9oi); Bullock v. Guilford, 5g Vt. 516, 9 Atl. 36o
(1887).
96 Lockwood v. Blodgett, io6 Conn. 525, 138 Atl. 520 (1927) ; State v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 147 Minn. 339, i8o N. W. io8 (1920); State ex rel. Ameri-
can Cent. Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 320 Mo. 901, 9 S. W.(2d) 621 (1928). Cf. Judy
v. Beckwith, 137 Iowa 24, 114 N. W. 565 (i9o8).
97 245 U. S. 54 (1917). See also Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879);
Blackstone v. Miller, i88 U. S. 189 (1903); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625
(igi6).
98 253 U. S. 325 (1920). 99 Id. at 330.
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to its own satisfaction does not change the fact that it was com-
pelled explicitly to notice it.' 0
In Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm.'1" the business situs
doctrine seems to be directly involved, in view of the fairly con-
tinuous and substantial advances which the Illinois resident had
made to the corporation carrying on business in South Caro-
lina. The state was thus able to make a strong argument that the
indebtedness was situated in South Carolina for tax purposes
under the business situs doctrine. As usual, the Court rather
dodged than answered this contention, but was constrained to
say:
"It is sought to sustain the tax by South Carolina upon the ground
that the indebtedness had what is called a' business situs ' in that State,
and the state court adverted to this basis for the tax. . . . But a con-
clusion that debts have thus acquired a business situs must have evidence
to support it, and it is our province to inquire whether there is such
evidence when the inquiry is essential to the enforcement of a right
suitably asserted under the Federal Constitution.
"In the present case, beyond the mere fact of stock ownership and the
existence of the indebtedness, there is no evidence whatever, having any
bearing upon the question, save a copy of the decedent's account with
the corporation, taken from his books which were kept by him in his
office at Chicago. The various items of debit and credit in this account,
in the absence of any further evidence, add nothing of substance to the
fact of the indebtedness as set forth in the agreed statement and afford no
adequate basis for a finding that the indebtedness had a business situs in
South Carolina." o0 2
It seems fair to say from this language that the Court recognized
its present tendency to throw considerable doubt upon the busi-
ness situs doctrine, but was unwilling to decide definitely the pres-
ent standing of the doctrine.
100 In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (X930), the
Court expressly declined to pass upon the present status of the business situs doc-
trine, saying, "The present record gives no occasion for us to inquire whether
such securities can be taxed a second time at the owner's domicile." Id. at 213.
See also the reference to the doctrine as leading to objectionable multiple taxation,
id. at 21o.
101 282 U. S. I (1930).
102 Id. at 8-9. The Court in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930), also
found, and with less obvious difficulty, that the business situs situation, especially
in its multiple taxation aspect, was not presented.
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When it came to decide First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine,"s
the Court was still painfully conscious of the haunting ghost of the
business situs doctrine. But the ghost was frustrated to the Court's
satisfaction in the following brief comment:
"We do not overlook the possibility that shares of stock, as well as
other intangibles, may be so used in a state other than that of the owner's
domicile as to give them a situs analogous to the actual situs of tangible
personal property. . . . That question heretofore has been reserved,
and it still is reserved to be disposed of when, if ever, it properly shall
be presented for our consideration." 104
This remark seems more than slightly naive, especially in con-
nection with the Beidler case. If the Court is going to continue to
find that the business situs situation is never presented, the doc-
trine is a ghost indeed; for all practical considerations, it is dead.
The business situs doctrine has a bearing on the other forms of
multiple taxation of property already discussed, since it was a con-
stant recourse of the Court in sustaining them. If the doctrine is
dead, it does not follow that these others forms of multiple taxation
have passed completely beyond the pale of judicial approval; but
it is certain that they must continue to exist, if at all, without the
chief support by analogy which they have previously enjoyed.
It hardly seems too much to say that if the business situs doctrine
is gone, all other forms of multiple property taxation have lost
significant vitality. For instance, in Rogers v. Hennepin County "'
the Court relied for its decision, that the stock exchange seat could
be taxed at the place where the exchange was located, upon the
analogy of the business situs cases and also the taxation of shares
of stocks of domestic corporations."'
103 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
104 Id. at 331. See also Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 5S Sup. Ct. 12
(1934), where the business situs doctrine, though possibly indirectly involved, was
ignored by the Court.
10 5 240 U. S. 184 (1916).
106 The Court said: "There is the further contention with respect to the
authority of the State to tax the memberships owned by citizens of other States.
It is urged that the memberships are intangible rights held by the member at his
domicile. But it sufficiently appears from the allegations that the memberships
represented rights and privileges which were exercised in transactions at the
exchange in the City of Minneapolis, and, we are of the opinion, applying a
principle which has had recognition with respect to credits in favor of non-
residents arising from business within the State, and in the case of shares of stock
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The argument based upon the taxation of shares of stock by
the state of incorporation is clearly no longer valid,"' and if the
business situs doctrine also goes, it would be hard to find any re-
maining rational basis for the theory of this decision. Further-
more, as already pointed out, the result of the Rogers case does not
seem to be in accordance with the present attitude of the Court
to regard multiple property taxation with distinct hostility. It
may be hazarded that this doctrine too has probably had its day,
and ceased to be.
The court has also used the business situs cases to buttress the
validity of taxes imposing a direct tax burden by more than one
state but not involving the actual multiple taxation of property.
This was done with respect to income taxes in DeGanay v.
Lederer,"°8 where the Court said:
"In the case under consideration the stocks and bonds were those of
corporations organized under the laws of the United States, and the
bonds and mortgages were secured upon property in Pennsylvania. The
certificates of stock, the bonds and mortgages were in the Pennsylvania
Company's offices in Philadelphia. Not only is this so, but the stocks,
bonds and mortgages were held under a power of attorney which gave
authority to the agent to sell, assign, or transfer any of them, and to
invest and reinvest the proceeds of such sales as it might deem best in
the management of the business and affairs of the principal. It is diffi-
cult to conceive how property could be more completely localized in the
United States." 109
But here, and also in the case of excise taxes, the possible with-
drawal of the support of the business situs doctrine is not likely
to prove fatal. In the first place the burden of such taxes is not
actually as heavy as that of multiple property taxation. In the
second place, looking at the question from a more technical stand-
point, neither an income nor an excise tax is a tax upon property,
and so the present condemnation of multiple property taxation,
of domestic corporations, that it was competent for the State to fix the situs of
the memberships for the purpose of taxation, whether they were held by residents
or non-residents, at the place within the State where the exchange was located."
Id. at 1g1.
107 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (X932).
108 250 U. S. 376 (i919).




even if it is carried to its logical extremity, will not affect the doc-
trines just referred to. Such income and excise taxes may in-
volve multiple taxation, but it is not multiple property taxation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has given unmistakable indication of its
present strong tendency to deprive the states of multiple prop-
erty taxation, upon which it once looked with indifference, if not
benignancy. As to tangible property, this change has been prac-
tically accomplished. As to intangible property, multiple taxa-
tion has been permitted until the last few years, but in that period
the Court has gone a long way toward putting an end to it. Such
slight remnants as are permitted by previous decisions of the Court
not explicitly overruled, must now be considered to rest upon a
very weak foundation.
While this does not necessarily apply to other forms of taxa-
tion, yet even here the tendency in the same direction is generally
apparent. Multiple inheritance taxation has seemingly been done
away with quite as fully as multiple property taxation; indeed,
practically all the recent cases showing the changed view of the
Court involve inheritance taxation, though they are certainly just
as applicable to property taxation."' While other forms of excise
taxes have not necessarily come under the same prohibition against
multiple burdens, it is quite probable that at least a tendency to
limit them rigidly will appear here also. Curiously enough, no
such tendency appears as yet with respect to income taxation; in
fact, it may well be contended that the direction is the other way.'
The most important doctrine leading to multiple property taxa-
tion which is still recognized by the decisions of the Court is busi-
ness situs. Since in all pertinent recent cases the Court has at
least considered the possibility that such decisions may interfere
with this doctrine, it does not seem too much to say that the Court
appreciates the difficulty in harmonizing its present hostility to
multiple taxation with the continued existence of the business
situs doctrine. It is submitted that multiple property taxation as
110 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
"11 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (932). But see Note (934)
43 YALE L. J. 8i.
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between the states will have to go and that so far as business situs
and other doctrines already considered permit such taxation, they
will have to be abolished or at least radically remodeled.
It has been suggested ".2 that the business situs doctrine will be
modified so that intangible property having a business locality in
a jurisdiction separate from the domicil of the owner will be per-
mitted to be taxed there and there only - thus treating it like
tangible property, under the Frick case."' This would avoid any
multiple taxation but would possibly run counter to the now set-
tled doctrine of the Supreme Court that evidences of indebted-
ness and similar documents cannot be treated as tangible prop-
erty.
1 14
A more substantial objection is present in the marked tendency
of the Court to take the position that practically all forms of in-
tangible property which cannot fairly be considered to have any
actual situs - and even tangible property which has no permanent
situs "' - are to be taxed at the domicil of the owner and there
alone. The Court attempts to rationalize this theory under the
maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam, but it hardly needs to be re-
peated that this is an attempted rationalization of the irrational.
It is really no more than a slightly disguised statement of the
Court's idea of policy. A summary statement of this policy is
that the property should of course be taxed somewhere, but that it
should be taxed only in one jurisdiction, and that the most de-
sirable jurisdiction to impose the tax in such a situation is the
domicil of the owner.
Prophecy of what the Court is going to do next, particularly in
view of the fact that it has habitually dodged the problem, at least
so far as the business situs doctrine is concerned, is extremely
hazardous. But it seems more rational, and possibly more accu-
rate, to attempt such a prophecy on the basis of the policy actually
112 See Harrow, Relation of Jurisdictional Limitations on Power to Tax to
Conflict of Laws in Decedents' Estates (034) 20 A. B. A. J. ix6.
113 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
114 The suggestion has, however, an analogy to the taxation of intangible
property like good-will used in carrying on a business within the state. See
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, x6S U. S. 194 (1897). But in that sort of case the
intangibles are merely incidental to the business rather than to the actual subject
of it, or at least the result of it, as is normally the situation in the business situs
cases, and in most of the others here considered.
115 New York v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (I9O6).
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adopted rather than on the Court's pseudo-rationalization of such
policy. Proceeding on this basis, the guess - and it can be no
more than a guess - of the writer is that all credits, whether used
in a business or not, will be subjected to taxation by the state of
domicil of the creditor and by no other jurisdiction. If that is so,
the business situs of the credits will be ignored and the doctrine
of taxation of credits at their business situs is wholly dead.
The principle of taxation solely at the domicil of the owner
will apply to all other forms of intangible property, unless, per-
haps, it can fairly be said in the particular case that such intangible
property -usually in the form of good-will or the value of a
going business- is substantially, and not merely theoretically,
situated with the business which uses it as an asset. But here,
too, it seems fairly clear that no multiple taxation will be per-
mitted, so that the state of domicil of the owner will be precluded
from taxing such intangibles. Apparently, multiple property taxa-
tion, as between the states, is to be regarded as entirely done
away with, and in the resulting situation the Court, except in
very unusual circumstances, is going to decide in favor of the
state of domicil of the owner.
Robert C. Brown.
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